Dollar intervention and the deutschemark-dollar exchange rate: a daily time-series model by Owen F. Humpage
WORKING  PAPER  8404 
DOLLAR  INTERVENTION  AND  THE 
DEUTSCHEMARK-DOLLAR  EXCHANGE  RATE: 
A  DAILY  TIME-SERIES MODEL 
by  Owen  F.  Humpage 
Michael  Bagshaw  provided statistical 
consul  tation and computer computation 
of the time-series models. 
Working papers of the Federal 
Reserve Bank  of Cleveland are 
prel  imi  nary materi  a1 s,  circulated 
to stimulate discussion and 
critical comment.  The  views 
stated herein are the author's and 
not necessarily those of the 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Cleveland 
or of the Federal  Reserve  System. 
September  1  984 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Cleveland 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyAbstract 
This paper develops  a simul  taneous  time-series model  to investigate the 
daily interactions between  official exchange-market  intervention and movements 
in  the deutschemark-doll  ar exchange  rate,  from November  2,  1978,  to October 
31,  1979,  The  model  is  constructed using both morning-opening and 
afternoon-closing exchange-rate  quotes.  Using  these  two  quotes,  and making 
assumptions  about the timing of intervention relative to the exchange-rate 
quotes,  enables us  to  measure  the causal  relationships among  contemporaneous 
variables.  The  results suggest  that,  over the period investigated,  the 
Federal  Reserve  responded  to  exchange-rate movements  in  a manner  consistent 
with a 1  eaning-against-the-wind  strategy,  but that this intervention tended to 
accentuate  slightly movements  in  the rate.  This result seems  to support 
claims that traders recognized intervention and  traded against it. 
I.  Introduction 
The  major industrial  ized nations abandoned  the Bretton Woods 
fixed-exchange-rate system in  March 1973,  after years of unsuccessful  attempts 
to recti  fy  its  persistent probl  ems.  Observers  have  characterized the 
subsequent exchange-rate regime as  a "dirty float."  While the major 
industrialized countries generally have  allowed fundamental  market  forces to 
determine their exchange  rates,  they periodical  ly  have  bought and  sol  d foreign 
exchange  to influence the market outcome.  The  volume  and  frequency of 
exchange-market  intervention have  varied greatly among  the developed countries. 
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In  recent years,  economists  have  beguri  to question  the efficacy of 
foreign-exchange-market  intervention,  especial ly if intervention is 
steril  ized,  and  especial ly if exchange  markets are highly efficient (see 
Genberg  1981 ; Rogoff  1983;  and  Sol omon  1983).  Such  concerns  resul ted  in 
the U.S.  decision of  March  1981  to reserve intervention only  for countering 
unusually  large fluctuations  in the exchange  markets  (see Sprinkel  1980). 
Since  that time,  the United  States has  intervened on  relatively few 
occasions.  At the Versailles summit  meeting  in June 1982,  many  European 
governments  criticized the  U. S.  decision  to cease routine intervention, 
arguing that it  contributed  to increased,  unnecessary  vol atil  i ty  in 
forei  gn-exchange  markets.  A  joint study of  intervention proposed  at the 
Versaill es summit  meeting,  however,  1  argely 1  eft the questions  unresol ved  (see 
Jurgensen 1  983). 
This  research  investigates the short-term effectiveness of  U.S. 
intervention  in the foreign-exchange market.  Existing research  generally does 
not support the view  that sterilized intervention has  a long-term impact  on 
the exchange  rate,  but researchers have  not  rejected the  possibility of  a 
near-term impact.  Such  an  investigation involves answering  two  sets of 
questions.  The  first set of  questions inquires about  the Federal  Reserve 
System's  response  to exchange-rate movements.  Does  the System  buy  (sell  ) 
do1 1  ars as the do1 1  ar depreciates  (appreciates  )?  Does  the Federal  Reserve 
respond  promptly  to exchange-rate movements,  or does  it  respond  with a lag?  A 
1  agged  response coul d  imply  greater exchange-rate  vol atil  i ty than  a prompt 
response.  Does  the Federal  Reserve  respond  to anticipated exchange-rate 
movements,  or does  it  respond  only  to unanticipated  exchange-rate movements? 
Does  it  respond  in a manner  that the  market can  anticipate?  In  a  highly 
efficient exchange  market,  participants could  predict and  offset routine 
intervention. 
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rate to the Federal  Reserve  System's  intervention.  Does  an  intervention 
purchase  (sale) of  dollars cause  the dollar to appreciate  (depreciate), and 
how  big is any  effect?  The  size of  U.S.  intervention could  be  too small 
relative to the scope  of  the exchange  market  to have  an  appreciable effect on 
the exchange  rate.  If  intervention does  affect the exchange  market,  how  long 
does  the impact  persist?  Even  a shock  will  die out quickly  in a highly 
efficient exchange  market. 
This  paper  develops a  simul taneous  time-series model  to investigate the 
daily interactions between  U. S.  exchange-market  intervention and  the 
deutschemark-do1 1  ar exchange  rate from  November  2,  1978,  to October  31 ,  1979. 
By  incorporating both  a morning-opening  and  an  afternoon-closing exchange-rate 
quote  and  assuming  that U.S.  intervention occurs only  in the interim,  this 
study attempts  to interpret the direction of  causality between  contemporary 
exchange-rate  movements  and  intervention.  The  model  a1 so  includes a variable 
for foreign intervention and  breaks  U.S.  intervention into purchases  and  sales 
of  deutschemarks  and  purchases  and sales of  all other foreign currencies. 
I  I.  Framework  and  Market  Efficiency 
Most  economists  regard  foreign-exchange markets,  like other asset markets, 
as highly efficient.  An  efficient market  "fully reflects" all relevant 
avail able information  about  today's events and  about  predictabl  c future 
events,  including pol icy  decisions.  Following  Fama  (1  970,  pp.  384-5),  the 
exchange  market  at  any  time,  t, is assumed  to possess 
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determi nation.  The  conditional  expectation of  tomorrow's  exchange  rate can  be 
expressed as: 
where  E  is the expected-value operator,  S  is the exchange  rate, and  4 
designates the change  in a variable.  Assuming  the exchange  market 
is efficient: 
I@  )I  =  0.  (2)  EISt+l  -  t 
That  is, the actual  value of  tomorrow's  exchange  rate is not expected  to 
deviate from  the  val ue  predicted today,  given  al 1 avai l  abl e  information. 
Therefore: 
(3)  St+l  =  E(St+ll+t)  +  alt, 
where  E(alt) =  0,  from  the assumption  expressed  in equation 2.  Finally,  by 
substituting equation 1 into equation  3: 
(4)  =  st +  E(ASt+, lmt)  + alt9 
which  implies that the change  in the exchange  rate from  time t to time  t+l 
consists of  an  expected  component,  based  on  a11  information  available at time 
t, and  an  unexpected  component.  The  market,  however,  could  incorporate all 
relevant information  available at time t into St.  In  this case, 
E(ASt+l  )  =  0,  and  the exchange-rate  series would  resemble  a random  walk : 
(5) Stel  =  St  + alt. 
The  information  set,  mt,  will  include  information  about  U.S. 
exchange-market  intervention,  at,  which  speci fies a  reaction  function  for 
intervention.  (The sets, @  and \,  could  be  equal. )  Following  the same 
arguments  as were  presented above,  U.S.  intervention  (D)  can  be  expressed as: 
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which  implies  that the change  in U.S.  intervention  between  time t and  time  t+l 
consists of  an  expected  component  based  on  the information  set,  \t,  and  an 
unexpected  component,  aet9 that represents policy  shocks.  A  similar 
expression can  be  derived for foreign  intervention,  R: 
(7)  Rt+l  =  Rt  +  E(ARt+l  I"*t)  + aSt9 
where  Q*t  is the relevant information  set contained  in (t. 
The  reaction  functions for the  U.S.  and  the foreign central  banks  could 
contain  the same  arguments;  therefore,  Dt  could be  correlated with  Rt. 
The  sign of  this correlation indicates cooperation or competi tion between  the 
two  intervention authorities, while  the magnitude  suggests  the intensity of 
the re1 ationship. 
In  a highly efficient exchange  market,  the participants learn to 
anticipate systematic  intervention and  incorporate this into thei  r 
expectations of  exchange-rate  movements.  Intervention coul d  a1 ter the 
anticipated exchange-rate  path  only  by  deviating  from i ts normal  behavior,  or 
"shocking"  the market.  Such  policies necessarily can  be  used  only 
infrequently if they  are to remain  unpredictabl e.  Moreover,  a highly 
efficient market could  quickly interpret such  pol icy  shocks  and  rapidly offset 
them  when  they  terminate. 
While  exchange  markets  are highly efficient,  they  probably are not 
perfectly efficient.  Information often is  costly to obtain and  slow  to 
disseminate  to a1 1 concerned  parties.  A  consensual  interpretation of  events 
often forms  rather slowly,  The  Federal  Reserve  and  the Treasury  might have 
better information  than the market at  certain times,  such  as when 
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policymakers  are considering a major  change  in monetary  or fiscal  policy,  or 
when  international  diplomatic  re1 ations are strained.  In  the processing of 
normal  information fl  ows  about  real  economic  devel opments,  prices,  interest 
rates, and  routine pol icy,  there is 1  i ttle reason  to suspect that pol icymakers 
are any  better informed  than  the market  participants. 
In  summary,  the foll  owing  general  equations characterize a highly 
efficient exchange  market: 
* 
(7)  Rt+l  =  Rt  +  E(  Rt+l  1%)  + a3t. 
111.  Estimation 
Using  this general  characterization of  an  efficient exchange  market,  we 
estimated a daily time-series model.  The  model  incorporates both  the New  York 
morning-opening  quote  (9:30  am)  and  the New  York  afternoon-cl osing quote 
(4:30  pm).  Obtained  from  the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York,  the 
exchange-rate data are daily averages of  the opening  or closing bid and  ask 
quotes  for the deutschemark-do1  1  ar exchange  rate.  The  deutschemark-do1 1  ar 
rate was  chosen  because of  its importance  in exchange  markets.  There are 13 
dates for which  data were  unavailable.  These  include Christmas  and  New  Year's 
Day,  on  which  no  U.S.  or foreign  intervention  took  place,  and  eight U.S. 
holidays on  which  no  U.S.  intervention occurred5  but on  which  foreign 
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exchange  rates were  missing.  The  blanks  were  filled with the previous day's 
observation,  because  univariate Box-Jenkins  analysis indicated that the 
exchange-rate  series foll  owed  a  random-wal k  and,  consequently,  that today's 
rate is  the best guide  of  tomorrow's  rate. 
The  Board  of  Governors  maintains the daily intervention  data  used  in this 
analysis.  The  figures represent dollar purchases  (+) or sales  (-1  in units of 
$1  mil 1 ion  made  by  the United States and  ten  other 1  arge developed 
countries.  There  is no  standard criterion for defining intervention; 
consequently,  some  disagreement  exists over the cl assification of  certain 
transactions.  Some  official dollar purchases might  be  omitted  from  the data 
because  the transactions were  not expressly  undertaken  to a1 ter the rate, even 
though  they could  have  had  that effe~t.~  Nevertheless, 
exchange-rate-stabil ization motives  dominate  movement  in the series. 
Central  banks  do  not conduct  their do1 1  ar intervention excl usively against 
deutschemark.  The  Federal  Reserve,  for example,  often buys Swiss  francs or 
Japanese yen,  and  non-German  foreign central  banks  usual ly trade their 
currencies for do1 1  ars.  Moreover,  the deutschemark-do1 1  ar exchange  rate is 
not the excl usive  intervention target.  Trades  of  do1 1  ars for deutschemark  are 
expected  to affect the deutschemark-do1 1  ar exchange  rate directly,  but do1 1  ar 
purchases  or sales against other foreign currencies also can  influence the 
deutschemark-do1 1  ar exchange  rate through  the cross-exchange  rates.  For  any  N 
convertible currencies,  there exists a  total of  N(N-1)  1/2 exchange  rates,  but 
only N-1  of  these will  be  independent  (see McKinnon  1979,  chap.  2). 
Arbitrage wjll  maintain  the exchange-rate configuration.  We  attempt to 
isolate the direct and  indirect effects of  U.S.  intervention on  the 
deutschemark-do1 1  ar exchange  rate by  breaking  U. S.  intervention into dollar 
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currencies  (see table 1 for a variable 1  isting).  A  similar breakdown  of 
foreign intervention was  not possible. 
The  model  is estimated for the year fol 1  owing  the November  1 , 1978, 
announcement of  strengthening of  U. S.  intervention activity.  (A1 1 data series 
contain 258  observations. )  Between  January 1, 1978,  and  October  31,  1978,  the 
dollar depreciated nearly 17  percent against the deutschemark  because of  a 
poor  U. S.  current-account position  and  accelerating inflation.  On  November  1, 
1978,  President Carter,  in conjunction with the Federal  Reserve,  announced  a 
1 percent  increase  in the discount  rate,  a $30-bill ion  increase in U.S. 
forei  gn-currency  reserves,  and  closer cooperation  with the German  Bundesbank, 
the Bank  of  Japan,  and  the Swiss  National  Bank.  The  intent of  the  November  1, 
1978,  policy change  was  to "correct what  had  become  an  excessive  decline  in 
the United  States dollar in the exchange  market"  (Holmes and  Pardee 1979, 
p.  67).  The  Federal  Reserve  sought  to sl  ow  the decl ine  in the do1 1  ar, or to 
lean against the wind.4  During  the next 12  months,  the dollar appreciated 
4.5  percent,  on  balance,  against the deutschemark. 
ARIMA  technique.  Jenkins  (1  979)  describes the technique  for 
simul taneously estimating  re1 ationshi  ps between  two  or more  time  series. 
Briefly, a  review  of  the autocorrelations and  of  the cross-correlations 
between  pairs of  these time  series provided  an  initial estimate of  the 
structure of  the model.  Next,  preliminary  values were  assigned  to the 
parameters,  and  final  values were  jointly determined  using approximate 
maximum-1 ikel i hood  techniques.  The  structure of  the model  was  modified,  and 
the parameters  re-estimated if not all of  the final  values from  the first pass 
were  statistically significant, and/or  significant autocorrelation  remained  in 
the residual  s. 
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employed  in this study.  First, it  provides  a direct test of  the response of 
intervention  to exchange-rate  movements  and  of  the effect of  intervention  on 
the exchange  rate.  Unlike  much  of  the  recent literature that seeks support 
for the portfol io-bal ance effect of  intervention  by  testing for risk premia, 
this work  does  not involve estimation of  a  joint hypothesis  (see Loopesko 
1983).  With respect to this issue,  the resul ts can  be  unambiguously 
interpreted.  Unfortunately,  the estimation  procedure  does  not expl ain -  how 
intervention affects the exchange  rate, only -  if intervention affects the  rate. 
The  pol icy horizon  adopted  by  the Federal  Reserve  for intervening  to "calm 
disorderly markets"  most  often seems  to be  short-term  .5  Since  this 
research  investigates the short-term re1 ationships between  intervention  and 
exchange-rate movements,  it  employs  daily data.  Although  tests on  data of 
1  ess frequency  (weekly,  monthly) can  provide an  approximation  to the short-run 
effect of  intervention,  such  data lose information about  the short-run 
relationships between  exchange-rate  movements  and  intervention.  In  August 
1979,  for example,  monthly  data  reveal  that the Federal  Reserve  bought  a 
moderate  number  of  dollars.  The  System,  however,  actually sold do1 lars on 
every day  that it  intervened except on  two  nonconsecutive  days;  on  these days, 
it  made  large dollar purchases.  Such  daily variations contain  much 
information about  the causes and  effects of  intervention,  but are "smoothed 
away"  in less frequent data. 
A  major  reason  for adopting  the estimation technique employed  here is that 
it  deals more  explicitly than  most  of  the existing literature with the 
difficult causality problem  intrinsic to investigations of  intervention and 
exchange-rate movements.  Exchange-rate  movements  trigger intervention,  but 
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intervention  influences exchange-rate movements.  Causal i ty is bidirectional . 
The  ARIMA  technique employed  here  provides  a test of  causality broadly 
consistent with  the time-speci fic definition associated with Granger  (1  969). 
According  to this definition,  a stationary time  series,  X,  is said to cause 
another  stationary  time  series,  Y,  if one  is better able to predict  Yt  using 
all  available information  than  using  all available information except  X.  A 
problem  in impl ementing  this approach  is interpreting the direction of 
causal i ty impl ied by  contemporaneous  correl ations when  bidi  rec ti  onal  causal i ty 
is suspected.  One  generally cannot tell which  contemporaneous  variable 
influences which,  unless  information  extraneous  to the model  is introduced. 
Empirical  tests using monthly  or quarterly data,  therefore,  lose one  month  or 
one  quarter of  data  because  of  the  problem  in interpreting contemporaneous 
correlations.  Daily  data minimize  this problem,  but since the  issue of 
interpreting the contemporaneous  correlation persists,  this study employs  both 
a morning-opening exchange-rate  quote  and  an  afternoon-cl osing exchange-rate 
quote.  On  the assumption  that U.S.  intervention occurs after the 
morning-opening quote,  but before  the afternoon-closing quote,  one  can  give a 
causal  interpretation to the estimated coefficients. 
The  ARIMA  technique  also converts  the time-series data  on  intervention and 
exchange  rates to a stationary process.  Many  studies do  not take this 
precaution;  for example,  using  daily data,  Wonnacott  (1982) found  lags in the 
Federal  Reserve's  reaction  to exchange-rate movements  of  30  days  and  90  days. 
This  resul t does  not seem  reasonable  in view  of  the short pol icy  horizon  of 
most  intervention and  could  resul t from  autocorrelation  in either the exchange 
rate or the intervention  time  series. 
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the model.  Besides  deciding which  variables to include,  the time  period  to 
consider,  and  the maximum  lag length  to test, the analysis places no  prior 
restrictions on  the model.  The  ARIMA  process also is compatible  with the 
notion of  exchange  markets  as highly efficient;  it  describes the model  in 
terms of  a known  and  a random  component. 
One  shortcoming of  the model  is that underlying  the estimation  technique 
is the assumption  that the exchange  rate and  intervention  time  series contain 
a1 1 re1 evant  information.  Having  additional  information,  for example,  on 
interest rates would  not improve  one's ability to predict the exchange  rate or 
intervention.  The  influence of  any  other contemporaneous,  1  agged,  or future 
variable is assumed  to be  fully reflected in lagged  values of  the exchange 
rates or intervention terms or to be  unanticipated.  An  obvious omission  is a 
variable to control  for monetary  policy.  The  exchange  market could  view 
intervention as a  signal  of  monetary  pol icy.  Without  control 1  ing for monetary 
policy,  therefore, we  might  falsely attribute the influence of  monetary  policy 
on  the exchange  rate to intervention.  The  problem  is that no  relevant 
monetary  aggregate exists on  a daily basis,  and  interest rates are an 
ambiguous  indicator of  pol icy  (see Rogoff  1983). 
The model. 
The  resul ting model  is  : 
9.  (1  -0.999883B)  SPMt  =  azt, 
1 
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(0.097)  (0.053) 
where  B  is  a  back-shift operator such  that B~  zt  =  ZZmn.  The  standard 
error of  each  estimated  parameter appears below  the relevant term except for 
equations 8 and  9,  where  the standard errors were  so small  that the computer 
program  would  not print them.  All  of  the coefficients are statistically 
significant at  the 95  percent confidence level.  Rearranging  the terms 
produces  the foll  owing  equations: 
8'.  SAMt  = 1 .000124  SPMt-l  +  al , 
9'.  SPMt  =  0.999883  SPMt -  +  a2t, 
10'.  DDMt  =  0.463895  DDMt -  +  a3t, 
11 ' .  DOTt  = 0.21 2335  DOTt -  +  aqt, 
12'.  RUSt  = 0.409878  RUSt -  +  0.266075  DDM  t-l  +  agt. 
In  this model,  lagged  intervention terms  do  not appear directly in either 
of  the exchange-rate equations,  and  1  agged  exchange  rates do  not appear 
directly in any  of  the intervention equations.  This  does  not preclude 
interaction between  the exchange  rate and  intervention.  Such  interaction is 
contemporaneous  and  is contained  in the correlations between  pairs of  the 
ai t(i =  1,2,3,4,5)  shock  terms.  The  ai  terms  have  zero means,  constant 
variances,  and  they contain no  autocorrelation.  Pairs of  the ait  tens, 
however,  are correlated as shown  in table 2.  All  of  these correlations are 
significant at  the 95  percent confidence 1  eve1 .  The  correl  ations between  the 
contemporaneous  shock  terms also are part of  this model  and  convey  important 
information about intervention  and  the exchange  rate. 
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underlying  the contemporaneous  correlations.  Consider  the contemporaneous 
correlation between  the unanticipated  movements  in the morning-opening 
exchange-rate  quote,  al t, and  unanticipated U.  S.  intervention  in the 
deutschemark-do1  lar market,  a3t;  it  is negative and  moderately  strong.  Is 
the negative correlation between  these terms  evidence  of  a 
1  eaning-against-the-wind  intervention  strategy  (causal i ty from  al  to 
a3t),  or is it  evidence  of  a perverse exchange-rate response  to intervention 
(causality from  agt  to alt)?  Because  alt represents unanticipated 
movements  i n  the morning-opening  quote  (SAM  1,  and  because  U.  S.  intervention 
occurs after the market's opening,  we  assume  that causality runs  from  al  to 
a3t*  Figure 1 ill  ustrates the assumed  direction of  causal i ty among  the 
contemporaneous  shock  terms.  We  assume  that U.S.  intervention,  both  DDM  and 
DOT,  ends  at the closing of  the market,  so  that causality  runs  from  agt  and 
aqt  to aZt,  with no  feedback  from  aZt.  We  also assume  that 
unanticipated  foreign  intervention  in the dollar market,  agt,  affects the 
afternoon-closing exc  a2t'  but we  are uncertain of  the 
predominant  di  rection of  causal i ty between  agt  and  al t.  Although  the 
foreign market  opens  before  the New  York  market,  the New  York  market  is open 
before  the European  market closes,  and  exchange-rate movements  in the U.S. 
market can  influence foreign  intervention.  Feedback,  therefore,  is highly 
1  ikely between  al  and  agt.  We  a1 so cannot speci fy causal  re1  ationshi ps 
among  the intervention  terms,  a3t,  aqt,  and  agt  Finally, it  seems 
reasonable that unanticipated movements  in the morning-opening  quote,  al t, 
could  influence movements  in the afternoon-closing quote,  aZt. 
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can  incorporate the information contained  in the contemporaneous  shock  terms 
directly into the model.  We  hypothesize: 
where  al  and  agt  are exogenous  variables,  where  the Qi  (i =  1,2,3,4,5) 
terms are "white  noise,"  and  where  the remaining  right-hand variables  "cause" 
the appropriate left-hand variable.  Equations 13 through 17 were  rewritten  in 
matrix form: 
C  .A = a, 
where  C  is a matrix of  the relevant parameters,  A  is a matrix of  the initial 
ait  shock  terms,  and  a is a matrix of  shock  terms after removing  the 
relevant cross-correlations.  We  estimated  the parameters  in the C  matrix, 
using  ordinary  least squares,  and  inverted  the resulting C  matrix  to yield: 
The  estimates for equations 14 through 16 are: 
where  all estimated  parameters are significant at the 95  percent confidence 
level.  In  previous  regressions the coefficient, cZ4 (suggested  in  equation 
14), was  not  significantly different from  zero,  so it  was  omitted from 
equation 18.  Tab1 e 3 shows  the remaining cross-correlations between  pairs 
of  u it terms. 
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through 12'  to incorporate the effects of  contemporaneous  intervention and 
exc  hange-rate movements  directly in  the model : 
21.  SAMt  = 1.000124  SPMt -  +alt9 
22.  SPMt  =  0.999883  SPMt  -  +  0.69391  a  - 0.00001 1 a 3t  -  0.000004  a  + a 2t, 
Equation  21  describes  the morning-opening exchange  rate (SAM)  as 
approximately  equal  to the previous day's closing quote  (SPM)  plus an 
unantici  pated component,  t.  The alt  component  remains correl  ated with 
the unanticipated component  for foreign intervention (a  suggesting some 
interaction between  the morning-opening exchange  rate and  foreign intervention 
(see tab1  e  3).  Because  the causal  re1  ationshi  p is  bidirectional  , it  could not 
be incorporated directly into the model . 
Equation  22  re1  ates the afternoon-exchange-rate quote  (SPMt)  tp its 
previous day's  value and  to shock  terms  associated with the morning-opening 
quote  (a  t),  U.S.  intervention against deutschemark  (a  and  foreign 
do1  lar  intervention (a 5t 1.  Ignoring momentarily  the intervention terms,  one 
coul  d  interpret this equation in  the following manner:  in  an  efficient 
market,  one  expects the afternoon  quote to equal  the morning quote plus an 
unanticipated component.  Simi  1  arly,  that morning's  quote  shoul  d equal  the 
previous day's closing quote plus a random  component.  The  program,  however, 
treats SPMt  and  S  poraneous  terms,  even  though  SAMt  occurs 
before SPMt.  Tim  nalysis does  not admi 
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contemporaneous  variables  in  equations,  because  its primary  objective is to 
forecast and,  in  a statistical sense,  all contemporaneous  terms  and  their 
interactions are unknown  at time  period,  t.  Any  interaction among  the 
contemporaneous  terms  not reflected by  lagged  terms  is reflected  in the 
correlations among  the shock  terms,  and  we  have exploited this information as 
discussed above.  Equation  22,  therefore,  relates SPMt  to SPMt-l, 
hut SPMt  -  equals SAMt  plus a random  term  and,  therefore,  the information 
contained  in SAMt  germane  to setting SPMt  is reflected in SPMtml  and  the 
unanticipated  term, a  associated with  the morning  quote. 
The  coefficients  in equation 22  associated with the intervention shock 
terms, a 3 t  (U.S.  intervention against deutschemark)  and a  (foreign 
do1 1  ar intervention), are negative.  This suggests that intervention  purchases 
of  do1 lars cause  the deutschemark-dollar exchange  rate to fall ; that is, 
intervention  purchases  of  dollars cause  the dollar to depreciate.  From  a 
central  bank's  perspective this is a  perverse  response.  The  magnitude  of  the 
coefficients,  however,  is fairly small.  A  U.S.  $100 mill ion  purchase  against 
deutschemark  woul d  cause  the deutschemark-do1 1  ar rate to fa1  1  only 0.06 
percent,  or substantially  less than  one  standard deviation  in the actual 
fluctuations of  the afternoon  rate experienced over  the period studied  (see 
tab1 e 1  1.  A  foreign $1 00  mill ion  purchase  woul d  cause  the deutschemark-do1 lar 
rate to fa1  1 less than  0.01  percent,  again  substantially less than  one 
standard deviation  in the actual  fluctuations of  the afternoon  rate 
experienced  over  the period studied. 
Equation  23  is  a reaction function for U.S.  intervention against 
deutschemark.  It shows  current dollar intervention against deutschemark 
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to unanticipated movements  in the morning-opening  deutschemark-dollar exchange 
rate  (a  1,  and  having  an  unanticipated component  (a 3t).  The  sign on  the 
coefficient associated with unanticipated movements  in the exchange  rate is 
negative,  suggesting a leaning-against-the-wind response  to unanticipated 
exchange-rate  movements.  When  the deu tschemark-do1 1  ar exchange  rate rises 
(falls), the Federal  Reserve  System  sells (buys) dollars to stem  the dollar's 
appreciation  (depreciation).  A  one-standard-deviation  increase in a  will 
1  ead  to a $59.0  mil 1  ion  purchase  of  deutschemark. 
Equation  24  describes  U.S.  intervention against currencies other than  the 
deutschemark.  The  form  of  the equation  is similar to that of  equation 23.  A 
one-standard-deviation  increase  in  a  is associated with  a $4.7  mil 1  ion 
purchase of  foreign currencies other than  deutschemark. 
Equation  25  relates foreign  dollar intervention  (Rust) to its lagged 
value  and lagged  U.S.  intervention against deutschemark  (DDMt -  ).  The 
positive coefficient associated with DDMt-l  suggests  that, on  average,  from 
the November  2,  1978,  to October  31,  1979,  U.  S.  and  foreign monetary  officials 
cooperated  in their intervention efforts, with  foreign  official  s maintaining 
the U.S.  intervention stance on  the following  day. 
IV.  Conclusion 
This  paper  has  presented a  time-series analysis of  the relationships 
among  daily deutschemark-do1 1  ar exchange  rates and  daily  U. S.  and  foreign 
intervention  from  November  2,  1978,  through  October  31,  1979.  The  results 
suggest  rvention  reacted without  a lag to unanticipated changes 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyin the morning-opening  exchange  rate in a manner  consistent with a 
leaning-against-the-wind strategy.  Such  a strategy would  tend  to dampen 
exchange-rate fluctuations if it  actually influenced the exchange  rate in the 
appropriate direction. 
The  results,  however,  do  not  indicate that intervention,  as conducted  over 
this period,  was  effective in changing  the exchange  rate in the desired 
direction.  The  signs on  the intervention  terms  in the closing-quote 
exchange-rate equation suggest  that U.S.  and  foreign intervention accentuated 
movements  in the exchange  rate.  The  size of  this impact,  however,  was  very 
small . 
The  response of  the exchange  rate to intervention seems  perverse from  the 
perspective of  the central  bank,  but could  be  rational  from  the perspective of 
private exchange-market  partici pants.  Forei gn-exchange  traders coul d  view 
central -bank  intervention as a signal  that the currency  being  purchased is 
fundamental ly weak,  and  they could  react to intervention  by  sell  ing  that 
currency.  According  to one  anonymous  foreign-exchange trader: 
There's  an  adage  in the marketplace  that says 
one  should  always  go  against an  intervention, 
since any  intervention  reflects an  inherent 
weakness  in the currency  being  supported. 
(Wall  Street Journal,  August  3,  1983,  p.3) 
The  model  might  have  failed to measure  a positive and  significant 
coefficient on  the intervention  terms  because  intervention was  too small 
relative to the  flows of  currencies  in the market.6  Over  the period 
studied,  for example,  U.S.  intervention against deutschemark  averaged  $26 
with  a  standard deviation of  $161  million.  Daily  transactions in the 
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exchange  market,  however,  averaged  in the  bill  ions.  Arguing  a1 ong  similar 
1  ines,  Hutchison  (1  984) contends  that if steril  ized intervention operates 
through  a portfolio-balance effect,  that is, by  a1 tering the  relative stock  of 
government bonds  he1 d  by  the  pub1 ic, then  the scope  of  intervention must  be 
large relative to the outstanding amounts  of  government  debt  held  by  the 
public.  U.S.  Treasury  debt he1 d  by  the public averaged  approximately  $630 
bill  ion  over  the period studied. 
A1 though  this study  used  daily data,  the impact  of  intervention could  die 
out too quickly  to be  picked  up  in the closing exchange-rate quote.  A 
one-shot  purchase  of  dollars could cause  the dollar to appreciate for only  a 
few  hours,  especially  if the market  is highly efficient and  especially if 
exchange  traders sense the Federal  Reserve's  presence  in the market. 
A1  though  the results of  this study suggest that intervention  did not a1 ter 
the exchange  rate in a direction consistent with central  bank  objectives,  they 
do  not entirely preclude the use  of  sterilized intervention as an  effective 
pol icy  tool.  Over  the period studied,  intervention was  conducted  frequently, 
and  the objectives of  intervention were  announced  on  November  1, 1978.  The 
market  probably  was  well  aware  of  the Federal  Reserve's  presence  in the 
market.  It is still possibl e that steril  ized  intervention,  used  periodically 
in a method  that surprises the market,  can  be  an  effective short-term policy 
tool  for influencing  the exchange  rate.  The  results of  this study  seem, 
therefore,  to support  the Treasury's  March  1981  decision  to use  intervention 
very  sparingly. 
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1.  Exchange-market intervention  refers to official  purchases  and  sales of 
foreign currencies  that nations undertake  to influence the exchange  value of 
their currencies.  Intervention  can  be  nonsterilized or sterilized. 
Nonsterilized intervention  results in a change  in relative money  supplies. 
Steril  ized  intervention  involves an  additional  open-market  transaction  in 
government securities that neutralizes any  effect the foreign-currency 
purchases or sales have  on  the country's domestic  money-stock  growth. 
2.  The  ten  foreign countries are Belgium,  Canada,  France,  West  Germany, 
Italy, Japan,  the Netherlands,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  and  the United  Kingdom. 
3.  Central  banks  often buy  foreign currency  for customer  transactions. 
Usually  the customer  is the home-country  government,  and  the funds  might be 
used  to repay  official  foreign-currency debts or to purchase mil i tary 
equipment.  Central  banks  a1 so buy  foreign currency to build  up or replenish 
foreign-currency  reserves;  sometimes  they enter the exchange  markets  to 
convert  interest payments on  foreign  reserves,  which  are paid  in foreign 
currency,  to domestic  currency.  The  objective of  such  policies is other than 
a1 tering the exchange  rate. 
Some  countries,  notably Japan,  have  been  suspected of  encouraging  their 
domestic  banks  to make  loans to foreigners or to buy  and  sell  foreign exchange 
and  of  subsidizing such  transactions  through  changes  in official deposits at 
commercial  banks.  Such  transactions are designed  to alter the exchange  rate, 
but are not recorded  in the intervention data. 
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Final ly,  some  countries,  especi a1 ly the United  Kingdom,  frequently 
intervene in small  amounts  to monitor  the exchange  market.  Such  intervention 
is more  to gather  information  than  to influence the exchange  rate. 
4.  A  1  eaning-agai nst-the-wi nd  intervention  strategy i s one  in which  a central 
bank  buys  (sells) its currency  as it  depreciates  (appreciates) in 
foreign-exchange markets,  but not  in such  quantities as to offset market 
trends completely.  That  is, the central  bank  attempts to smooth  fluctuations 
in the exchange  rate without reversing them. 
5.  The  Federal  Reserve  intervenes  to counter disorderly market  conditions,  a 
concept  that has  never  been  defined  precisely  (and probably  could  not be), but 
generally  seems  to depend  on  the trading desk's perception of  the degree  of 
confidence  underlying  the market's near-term  exchange-rate forecast.  The 
Federal  Reserve  usually  identifies disorderly markets  by  abrupt changes  in 
exchange  rates, one-way  markets,  wide  bi  d-ask  spreads,  and  persistent bidding 
at which  no  offers are made.  All  of  these are indicators of  market 
uncertainty.  Nevertheless,  disorderly markets are ul timately  in the eye  of 
the  behol der. 
6.  Some  readers have  suggested  that the seemingly  "perverse"  response  might 
be  explained  as fofl  ows:  Each  time  the do1 1  ar depreciates  (appreciates), the 
Federal  Reserve  buys  (sell  s) do1 1  ars.  The  amount  is too small  to a1 ter the 
dollar's direction,  but it  is sufficient to dampen  the dollar's movement. 
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Consequently,  closing-quote do1  lar  depreciations continue to be  correlated 
with dollar purchases.  The  problem with this argument  is  that the "perverse" 
coefficient describes  a partial correlation.  Even if  the intervention were 
not sufficient to reverse the do1  lar'  s movement,  intervention would be 
associated with smaller  do1  lar  movement.  Hence,  the partial correlation 
should have  the expected  sign,  not the "perverse" sign,  when  intervention 
dampens  exchange-rate movements. 
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Best available copyTab1 e 1  Time-Series  Variables 
Standard 
Variable  Definition  -  Meana  devi  ati  ona 
SAN  morn? ng-openi ng  (9:  30  am)  deutschemark-  1.8559  0.0437 
do1 1  ar exchange  rate. 
SPM  afternoon-cl  osing  (4: 30 pm)  deutschemark-  1.8555  0.0439 
do1 1  ar exchange  rate. 
DDM  U.S.  purchases  (+) or sales  (-1 of  dollars  26.3  161.2 
against deutschemark;  $1  mill ion. 
DOT  U.S.  purchases I+)  or sales  (-1  of  dollars  -2.6  26.6 
against other foreign currencies;  $1  mi  11  ion. 
RUS  aggregate do1 1  ar i  nterventi  on  by  Be%  gi  urn,  -1 5.5  293.5 
Canada,  France,  West  Germany,  Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands,  Sweden,  Switzerland,  and 
the United  Kingdom. 
a.  Measured  from  November  2,  1978,  to October  31,  1979. 
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Best available copyTable  2  Unanticipated-Movement  Term  and  Associated Time-Series Variable as 
Calculated  in the Model 
Unanticipated  Associated  Standard 








Best available copyTable  3  Unanticipated-Movement Terms  and Associated Time-Series  Variable as 
Calculated in  the Adjusted Model 
Unanticipated  Associated  Standard 
term  vari  abl  e  Mean  deviation 
a It  SAM  -0.4391  0.00008 
a  2t  SPM  0.2276  0.00005 
a  3t  DDM  12.1  126.5 
a  4t  DOT  -2.3  25.5 
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